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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, J 
Plaintiff/Appellee, \ 
vs. J 
JUAN ANTHONY PORTILLO, i 
Defendant/Appellant. J 
i Case No. 940387-CA 
i Priority No. 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT IS PLAIN ERROR FOR A JUDGE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON THE PENALTY FOR THE OFFENSE CHARGED 
The State argues that the trial court committed no e r r o r — 
obvious or otherwise—in instructing and questioning the jury 
during voir dire on the punishment mandated by law for each 
charge because the trial court's "venire voir dire... properly 
afforded the parties an opportunity to explore whether any venire 
member held a particular penalty bias and, consequently, to 
ensure that the jury impaneled could reach an impartial decision 
unencumbered by irrelevant concerns over the applicable 
penalities" (Br. of Appellee at 8, 11-13). l 
during voir dire the trial court informed the jury panel of 
the penalty mandated by law for each count (R. 161 at 15-17) and 
then questioned the venire panel whether "anyone believes that the 
punishment fixed by law is too severe or too light for the offense 
charged" (R. 161 at 34). 
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Portillo, however, asserts that it was, in fact, obvious 
error for the trial court to instruct and question the venire 
panel with respect to penalty. Where there is no statutory 
provision mandating a jury role in penalty determination, both 
Utah and federal courts have stated repeatedly during the past 
twenty-years that punishment is the exclusive perogative of the 
trial court and should not be considered by the jury in rendering 
a verdict of guilt or innocence.2 
In this case the jury had no statutory role in penalty 
determination. The possible penalties which could be imposed in 
2Utah cases include: State v. Cude, 784 P.2d 1197, 1202-03 
(Utah 1989)(Possible punishment is not a proper matter for jury 
consideration because a determination of guilt or innocence 
shouldn't be swayed by a jury's feelings towards a defendant 
because of an anticipated sentence); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 
291, 296 (Utah 1988) (Jury is ordinarily not informed of the 
punishment and the length of a possible sentence is generally 
thought to be irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence); Salt 
Lake City v. Tuero,745 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah 1987) ("Sentencing is 
the perogative of the trial court... and the jury has no function 
in the process. To question the jury panel concerning their 
opinions of a potential sentence may invite confusion on the jury's 
part as to their proper role in the trial"). 
Federal cases are: Shannon v. United States, U.S. , 
114 S.Ct. 2419, 2424 (1994)(The trial court holds the authority to 
impose sentences once the jury has rendered a guilty verdict and if 
jurors are provided with sentencing information they are invited to 
"ponder matters that are not within their province", they will be 
distracted from their fact finding obligation, and their will be a 
strong liklihood of confusion); Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 
35, 40 (1975) (Jury should reach its verdict "without regard to 
what sentence might be imposed"); United States v. McCracken, 488 
F.2d 406, 424 (5th Cir. 1974) (To inform the jury of punishment 
"draws the attention of the jury away from their chief function as 
sole judges of the facts, opens the door to compromise verdicts" 
and a jury's consideration of the penalty is prejudicial error). 
Chapman v. United States, 443 F.2d 917, 920 (10th Cir. 1971) (It is 
error to tell the jury about the consequences of a certain 
verdict). 
2 
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this case are irrelevant to the jury's determination of guilt or 
innocence arising from their fact-finding function. Therefore, 
it was obvious error in this case for the trial court to instruct 
the jury on the penalties fixed by law for each count, and to 
question the panel with respect to their opinions about the 
mandated punishments, because the jury had no function in the 
sentencing process. 
Because the trial court's error was obvious, under the plain 
error or manifest injustice standard, it wil result in reversal 
if it was prejudicial. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 
(Utah 1989). The State argues that any prejudice which may have 
resulted from the trial court's error was cured by the 
instruction given by the court to the impaneled jury that they 
shouldn't consider nor discuss the subject of penalty and that 
possible punishment for the crimes charged mustn't affect their 
decision as to Portillo's guilt or innocence (R. 78, Br. of 
Appellee at 14-15). 
However, it is clear from the question submitted by the jury 
during deliberation (R. 106), and from the fact that the jury 
reached a verdict almost immediately after the question was 
answered (R. 180), that the jury failed to heed the trial court's 
subsequent instruction to "disregard punishment." Therefore, the 
trial court's erroneous penalty instructions constituted 
prejudicial error, which is a sufficient basis to warrant 
reversal of Portillo's conviction. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY INCLUDING IN ITS JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY THAT A SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENT OF 
COUNTS II AND III IS THAT THESE VIOLATIONS ARE A SECOND 
OR SUBSEQUENT VIOLATION OF THE SAME STATUTE 
In Appellant's brief, Portillo argued that the trial court 
committed two obvious and prejudicial errors in its Jury 
Instructions 3-5, which resulted in a manifest injustice. The 
first of these errors is the trial court's use of the term 
"violation" rather than the statutory term "conviction." 
However, Portillo concedes that State v. Hunt, 277 Utah Adv. Rep. 
30 (Utah 1995), renders harmless any error by the trial court's 
use of the word "violation" rather than "conviction" in Jury 
Instructions 3-5 (R. 100-102). 
The second obvious and prejudicial error alleged by Portillo 
concerns the criminal elements of Counts I-III set forth in Jury 
Instructions 3-5. Counts I-III are all charges of Distribution 
of Marijuana in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-
8(a)(ii). While count I was charged as a third degree felony, 
counts II and III were charged as second degree felonies as 
"second or subsequent convictions" under Utah Code Annotated § 
58-37-8(b)(ii). 
Jury Instructions 4-5 (counts II and III) add as a seventh 
essential element: "That this distribution was a second or 
subsequent violation occurring after a previous violation of the 
same statute" (R. 100-101). Portillo asserts that based upon the 
plain language of Utah Code Annotated §§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) and 
4 
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(l)(b)(ii), whether or not a charge is a "second or subsequent 
conviction" is not a substantive element of the crime, but a 
sentencing enhancement. 
Subsection (l)(a)(ii) sets out the substantive elements of 
counts I-III: it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally distribute or arrange to distribute a controlled 
substance. On the other hand, subsection (l)(b) sets forth the 
penalty for a violation of subsection (l)(a): "Any person 
convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: (ii) 
... marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony and upon a 
second or subsequent conviction punishable under this subsection 
is guilty of a second degree felony." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(b)(ii). In Allison v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 
P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court declared: 
where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this 
Court will not look beyond to divine legislative 
intent. Instead, we are guided by the rule that a 
statute should be construed according to its plain 
language. 
Therefore, based upon the plain statutory language of Utah Code 
Annotated §§ 58-37-8(a)(ii) and (b)(ii), Portillo asserts that 
the trial court committed obvious error in instructing the jury 
that a substantive element of counts II and III is "That this 
distribution was a second or subsequent violation occurring after 
a previous violation of the same statute" (R. 100-101). 
Moreover, Portillo asserts that such error in Jury 
Instructions 4-5 was prejudicial, it resulted in a manifest 
injustice, and it deprived Portillo of a reasonable liklihood of 
5 
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a more favorable result, because the instructions as written 
prevented each charge from being evaluated individually on the 
evidence presented at trial as required by law. The language of 
Instructions 4-5 required the jury to make either an all or 
nothing finding of guilt, i.e., if the jury did not convict 
Portillo of Count I then it could not convict him of Counts II or 
III which, according to the given instructions, required a 
finding of a second or subsequent violation. 
During deliberation, the jury submitted a written question 
to the trial court which stated: "The 3rd charge, instruction 
#5, element #7 refers to this charge as a subsequent violation. 
If count one and count two are 'not guilty,' can a guilty verdict 
be given for count 3" (R. 106). Fifteen minutes after receipt of 
the court's "no" answer the jury reached a verdict of "guilty" to 
counts I-III (R. 180). The question, coupled with the fact that 
the jury reached a verdict almost immediately after the question 
was answered, clearly demonstrates that the jury was pondering a 
"not guilty" verdict for Counts I and II, but were swayed from 
such a more favorable result by the language of Jury Instructions 
4-5 which required a finding of guilt under Count I before a 
finding of guilt could be made under Count II and III.3 
3In Appellant's brief, Portillo argues that the evidence 
produced at trial with respect to counts I and II was insufficient 
as compared to count III, where a search warrant was executed on 
Portillo's residence following the controlled buy and drugs and the 
defendant were both found in the residence (Br. of Appellant at 24-
25). 
6 
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The State argues that error, if any, was favorable to 
Portillo because it required "the jury to find that counts II and 
III constituted second or subsequent violations of the drug 
statute before it could convict on either count, the trial court 
essentially required the jury to find more elements than actually 
required" (Br. of Appellee at 25). The State further asserts 
that if "the jury had been instructed as now requested by 
defendant... defendant ran the risk of being convicted for counts 
II and III, regardless of the jury's decision to convict or not 
convict for count I. In short, such an instruction would have 
made it even more likely that defendant would be convicted on all 
three counts (Br. of Appellee at 25-26). 
However, Portillo argues that he was in fact—in spite of 
the State's assertion of favorable error—convicted of counts I, 
II and III. In addition, had the jury felt that Portillo was 
guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt" with respect to count I, there 
would have been no need to question the court as they did with 
respect to the effect of "instruction #5, element #7" (R. 106) 
because the answer would not have mattered—nor would the 
question have arised. Moreover, the jury's question also refered 
to count II in terms of a "not guilty" verdict (R. 106), which 
suggests that the jury must also have had reasonable doubt as to 
the State's proof of that charge. 
Therefore, absent the erroneous language in Instructions 4-
5, there was a reasonable liklihood that Portillo would have been 
acquitted of counts I and II. This is where the real prejudice 
7 
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or manifest injustice lies: Had Portillo been acquitted of 
counts I and II, count III would have been a third degree felony 
because there would have been no prior convictions. As a result, 
Portillo would have been convicted of three third degree felonies 
and a class B misdemeanor. Instead, because of the erroroneous 
instructions, Portillo was convicted of two second degree 
felonies, three third degree felonies, and a class B misdemeanor. 
POINT III 
THE ERRORS COMMITTED AT TRIAL 
CUMULATIVELY PREJUDICED PORTILLO 
If the errors committed at trial—including those argued 
supra—are found by this Court to be harmless individually, 
Portillo requests that this Court consider if they were 
cumulatively harmful. "'Cumulative error' refers to a number of 
error's which prejudice [a] defendant's right to a fair trial." 
State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1146 (Utah 1989) (quoting State 
v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 1986)). 
Under the cumulative error doctrine, this Court will reverse 
only if "the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines 
our confidence. . . that a fair trial was had." Whitehead v. 
American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990). 
However, "[i]n assessing a claim of cumulative error, [this Court 
will] consider all the identified errors, as well as any errors 
we assume may have occurred." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, , 
208 Utah Adv. Rep. 100, 114 (Utah 1993). 
Portillo, as argued supra, asserts that the trial court 
committed two obvious errors at trial. One, the trial court 
8 
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instructed and questioned the jury with respect to punishment; 
and two, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that a 
substantive element of counts II and III was "That this 
distribution was a second or subsequent violation occurring after 
a previous violation of the same statute," Portillo asserts that 
these errors were individually prejudicial to him. Moreover, he 
argues that when the effect of these errors is viewed 
cumulatively, this Court's confidence in the fairness of 
Portillo's trial should be sufficiently undermined to warrant 
reversal. 
The trial court's instructing and questioning the jury about 
the possible penalties which could attach to the charges invited 
the jury, throughout trial, to "ponder matters that are not 
within their province." Shannon v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 
2419, 2424 (1994). The jury's knowledge of the penalty also gave 
a weightier importance to a finding of guilt under Count III 
because of its more severe punishment. 
This error particularly prejudiced Portillo when it is 
coupled with the erroroneous seventh element in Jury Instructions 
4-5. The jury—which by the wording of the submitted question 
was clearly pondering a "not guilty" verdict for Counts I and II 
due to an insufficiency of evidence, particularly with respect to 
identification—was left with the choice of convicting Portillo 
of either all or none of the first three charges. The fact that 
the jury had been instructed by the court as to the punishment 
9 
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also clearly prejudiced the potentiality of a "not guilty-
verdict on Counts I and II. 
As a result of these errors, and the cumulative harm and 
prejudiced which resulted, Portillo requests that this Court 
vacate his convictions on grounds that the Court's confidence in 
the fairness of the trial is undermined. 
POINT IV 
PORTILLO WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Portillo asserts that the position he takes in Point V of 
Appellant's brief is correct and should be adopted by this Court. 
Namely, that this court should conclude as a matter of law that, 
based upon the obvious and prejudicial errors in the record to 
which no objections were made, Portillo was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel mandated by both the Utah and United States 
constitutions. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the manifest injustice which resulted from the 
obvious and prejudicial errors set forth above and in Appellant's 
brief, this court should vacate Portillo's conviction and remand 
the case for a new trial. 
DATED this /Q day of January, 1996. 
'7k. 
Margar^ P. Lindsay ' 
Attorney for Portillo [/' 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief Of Appellant to the 
following: Marian Decker, Assistant Attorney General, Jan 
Graham, Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114, this /O day of January, 1996. 
pi fa* /(A Attuf.-U ds? *y, 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
